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1 Introduction
Since Quine’s Word and Object [Qui60], there has been more-or-less general
agreement on the correct treatment on the status of talk about intentional
attitudes. In a strict ontological sense, “the canonical scheme for us is the
austere scheme” according to which there are “no propositional attitudes but
only the physical constitution and behaviour of organisms” [Qui60, p. 221].
However, intentional idioms are “practically indispensable”; they are “es-
sentially dramatic” idioms [Qui60, p. 219].1 There are, of course, disagree-
ments within this general viewpoint, particularly as to the exact nature
of the “dramatic” roˆle played in ascribing intentional attitudes. Dennett
[Den87, pp. 342–343] divides the resulting accounts into those based on a
normative principle, according to which we ascribe the attitudes an agent
ought to have, given its circumstances, and those based on a projective prin-
ciple, whereby one ascribes those attitudes that one would have oneself in
those circumstances. In this paper, I want to consider the former group of
accounts, which includes those based around Davidson’s principle of charity
[Dav85] and Dennett’s own intentional stance [Den87]. In particular, I want
to argue that Dennett’s intentional stance has great difficulty in dealing with
agents with bounded rationality—you, me, and everyone else.
I will assume, without much argument, that Dennett’s motivation is
more or less correct, but argue that the method he gives us for ascribing
beliefs and desires to others cannot avoid attributing too much. I will then
suggest another method, based on Dennett’s, which avoids the problem. I
will conclude by showing how this final method delivers a notion of epis-
temic possibility which, while satisfying many of the relevant intuitions that
philosophers and logicians assure us they have, does not treat agents as
perfectly rational reasoners.
1See also Sellars [Sel56].
1
2 The Intentional Method
Dennett’s intentional stance is intended as a way of bridging the gap between
realist and interpretational accounts of intentional attitude attribution (or
rather, of claiming that this is a deeply unhelpful dichotomy). Dennett
holds that, “while belief is a perfectly objective phenomenon . . . it can be
discerned only from the point of view of one who adopts a certain predictive
strategy, and its existence can be confirmed only by an assessment of the
success of that strategy” [Den87, p. 15]. Here, Dennett is in agreement
with Quine in that determining the truth of belief attributions could not be
reduced to the existence some underlying physical phenomena:
It will often happen also that there is just no saying whether to
count an affirmation of propositional attitude as true or false,
even given full knowledge of its circumstances and purposes.
[Qui60, p. 218]
Dennett describes his approach as follows:
first you decide to treat the object whose behavior is to be pre-
dicted as a rational agent; then you figure out what beliefs that
agent ought to have, given its place in the world and its purpose.
Then you figure out what desires it ought to have, on the same
considerations, and finally you predict that this rational agent
will act to further its goals in the light of its beliefs. A little
practical reasoning from the chosen set of beliefs and desires will
in most instances yield a decision about what the agent ought
to do; that is what you predict the agent will do. [Den87, p. 17]
Let us call the method of ascribing beliefs along these lines the intentional
method. There are two main problems with Dennett’s account. To begin
with, it is hard to explain false belief; and secondly, in treating agents as
perfect reasoners, it is difficult to distinguish those beliefs an agent has,
from those it might come to believe through further reasoning. I propose to
ignore the former worry (which Dennett discusses at [Den87, pp. 18–19 and
83–88]; see [Sti81] for criticism of this view) and concentrate on the latter.
Dennett [Den81, chapter 16] distinguishes opinion, which is a classical
on-off affair, from belief which may be a matter of degree, governed by
Baysian rules. Opinion is a matter of assent (or, as Perry [Per80] has it, of
accepting a sentence as true) but nevertheless belief provides the basis for
an agent’s opinion. We should at the least be able to say, given that agent
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a has these beliefs, that it should be able to assent to this or that (or come
to this opinion). Dennett agrees with de Sousa [dS71] that a Baysian-style
theory of belief should be used “to explain (or at least predict statistically)
the acts of assent we will make given our animal-level beliefs and desires.”
Such beliefs “explain our proclivity to make these leaps of assent, to act, to
bet on the truth of various sentences.” [Den81, p. 304].
The problem here is that one can only give one’s assent based on one’s
beliefs if one can see how what one is assenting to is one of, or is supported
by, one’s beliefs; otherwise, we are simply discussing an agent who guesses all
the time. Let us consider an example. Any student with a very minimal set
of beliefs (that one should endeavour to answer the questions; one should
give the answers one believes to be true . . . ) would be predicted to do
very well in his first-year logic exam. Similarly, a mathematics student who
knows the axioms of some theory would be said to believe (and also know)
all theorems of the theory—however complicated they may be. In fact, few
students achieve 100% on their logic test and no one knows or believes all the
theorems of arithmetic, say, let alone all the relevant meta-theorems. This
is why logical and mathematical discoveries are surprising and informative.
My bias in this discussion is therefore motivated by the following principle:
we should not ascribe beliefs to agents which they could not, given their
cognitive limitations, assent to.
This motivates the following question: what notion do we capture when
we treat agents as perfectly ideal Baysian reasoners? Certainly not belief
(at least, as we use the term), for real agents are far from ideally rational
when it comes to managing their own beliefs. But the assumption of perfect
rationality nevertheless has a place, in showing what an agent’s rational
commitments are in having certain beliefs. In judging the world to be a
certain way, for instance, an agent commits itself to the consequences of
that judgement. If an agent judges φ1, . . . φn to be the case, and ψ is a
consequence of these judgements but is rejected by the agent, then we could
point of some error in the agent’s reasoning. In showing the agent that ψ is
a consequence of judgements she has made, we would expect her to either
change her mind about ψ or else reject of one of the original judgements.
In talking about the consequences of an agent’s judgements, we may want
to restrict the notion to relevant consequences, perhaps by taking relevant
implication as our model. In this way, we can rule out the strange commit-
ments involving material implications which would otherwise, such as one’s
judgements about what to have for tea committing one to p→ q∨q → r, for
any (completely unrelated) propositions p, q, r. In a similar way, the notion
of commitment should avoid the ex contradictione quad libet principle, or
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principle of explosion, whereby contradictory judgements would commit an
agent to every proposition whatsoever. An acceptable, non-explosive notion
of consequence must therefore tolerate a degree of contradiction, as para-
consistent logics do. So, the notion of commitment, given what an agent
judges, should be characterised along the lines of a paraconsistent, relevant
consequence relation.
It is clear that this notion of commitment is too strong for an analysis
of belief. An agent need not believe all of the things it commits itself to in
making judgements; it could only do so if it were an ideal agent, with perfect
rationality and unlimited cognitive capacity (memory, time to reason and so
on). So, the commitments one forms in making judgements form an upper
limit on what that agent believes. Moreover, the judgements an agent makes
(the opinions it forms, the sentences it accepts or assents to) form a lower
bound on what the agent believes. If an agent judges that φ then it believes
that φ, and it believes φ only if it is thereby committed to the truth of φ.
3 Bounded Rationality
In the previous section, the consequences of an agent’s beliefs were termed
the commitments of those beliefs. The question that needs to be addressed
now is: how can the intentional method result in a notion of belief which
differs from (is weaker than) that of commitment? Dennett’s suggestion is
as follows.
One starts with the idea of perfect rationality and revises down-
wards as circumstances dictate. That is, one starts with the as-
sumption that people believe all the implications of their beliefs
and believe no contradictory pairs of beliefs. . . . one is inter-
ested only in ensuring that the system is rational enough to get
to the particular implications that are relevant to its behavioural
predicament of the moment. [Den87, p. 21]
Let us call this the downwards revision approach. Now, one might quite
legitimately ask: just what is the measure of rationality appealed to here
supposed to consist in? and just how does one revise downwards? I now
take a look at two possible suggestions which attempt to explain down-
wards revision. Since the intentional method incorporates a formal model
of belief—a Baysian model, for instance—these approaches to downward re-
vision should also be based on a more-or-less formal approach. Otherwise,
4
we will not have a method at all; rather, we will be left with an ad hoc way
of pruning beliefs.
A first suggestion is found in Hintikka’s notion of logical competence
[Hin75]. To be sure, one’s logical competence does not exhaust one’s ratio-
nal ability but it is a component of it. If we cannot provide a method of
downward revision to the way we ascribe logical competency to an agent,
we cannot give a method of downwards revision for the way we ascribe
rationality to that agent in general.
Hintikka’s notion of logical competency comes in both a syntactic and
a semantic form, but the results are the same either way. Here, I describe
the semantic version,2 which describes logical models which are inconsistent
from a classical point of view, but “so subtly inconsistent that the incon-
sistency could not be expected to be known (perceived) by an everyday
logician, however competent.” [Hin75, p. 478] Suppose an agent considers
the sentences satisfied by such a model to state genuine possibilities. That
agent will thereby be taking some impossibilities to be possible and, in do-
ing so, will not consider all valid sentences to be true. We therefore have
some handle on her logical competence, depending on the degree to which
contradictions in the model manifest themselves.
The details of such models are provided by Rantala in [Ran75], where
he uses the term urn models. The domain is conceived as a huge urn from
which individuals may be drawn (the urn metaphor is taken from elementary
probability theory). Sequences of quantifiers embedded one within the scope
of another are restrictions on draws from the urn. Now, a classical model is
one in which the contents of the urn remains constant between draws—such
models are known as invariant models. Rantala then considers changing
models, whose urn has a mechanism attached which may alter the contents
from one draw to the next. In this way, sentences which are classically invalid
may nevertheless be satisfied by an urn model. The level of inconsistency
in a urn model is viewed as the number of draws which occur before any
change in the available individuals takes place. Suppose the largest number
of nested quantifiers in a sentence φ is d (d is said to be the depth of φ).
Then, if the domain/urn in a model M remains constant for at least the
first d draws, M will agree with classical models as to the validity or logical
falsehood of φ. Such models are called d-invariant.
Hintikka’s idea is to use the parameter d as a measure of an agent’s logical
competency, for sentences with deeply embedded quantifiers are harder to
understand than those without. The more competent the agent, therefore,
2The syntactic account is in terms of surface information—see [Hin73].
5
the larger the value of d. An agent whose competency is d will be able to
recognise the validity of all valid sentences whise depth does not exceed d,
but might get it wrong in the case of more complex sentences. We thus
have a way of ascribing first perfect rationality to an agent, in line with the
intentional method, and then revising downwards. To do so, we figure out
the value of d needed to make predictions about the agent’s behaviour and
consider all d-invariant models. Since some of these models will be changing
models—i.e. their domain will alter after n draws, for some n > d, the agent
will believe in some classically invalid sentence, so could not be said to be
perfectly rational.
However, agents remain believers in all instances of propositional tau-
tologies on this account (for when there are no quantifiers involved, urn
models agree with classical models). An agent’s variable-free beliefs will be
deductively closed, and we will not be able to subtract from our initial as-
sumption of perfect rationality in this domain. Secondly, we have no reason
to suppose that an agent’s competence will be a fixed parameter across the
board. There are numerous sentences which the agent could derive, given
her assumed degree of rationality and which she will therefore be ascribed
belief in on the intentional method, which she will in fact not believe in the
slightest. A mathematician who has spent months working towards proving
a particular theorem is likely to have beliefs in that domain of far greater
justificatory complexity than in other domains, or even in other mathemat-
ical fields. Our logician might even be able to prove a complex theorem
but have trouble with, what from the viewpoint of quantifier depth alone,
appears to be less complex, such as deriving a corollary. This could not be
explained using Hintikka’s notion of logical competence.3
Another suggestion as to how we might scale down our attributions of
rationality from the ideal case is as follows. The beliefs we ascribe on the
back of the intentional method are not ascribed piecemeal, but as part of a
holistic network. Certain beliefs support certain others such that, in the case
of a perfectly rational agent, believing the supports is sufficient for believing
the supported beliefs. So we have a justification network: a network of
beliefs with justifications marked within it. Such structures are common
in current AI practise.4 Some beliefs might be taken to be primitive, or
supplied by experience and so have no support within the network of beliefs
itself. These include the mundane, everyday beliefs which we are too busy
to ever explicitly consider or judge, such as the belief that the chair will
3Similar examples are discussed in [Jag06b, ch 2, §1.4.2].
4They are used extensively in the areas of belief revision and belief update, for example.
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remain where it is whilst I attempt to sit on it.
Suppose we mark such beliefs as being evidentially (as opposed inferen-
tially) justified and then calculate the justificatory complexity of the other
beliefs based on the shortest path in the justification network from that be-
lief to a set of beliefs which supports it. We could then revise downwards
by throwing our those beliefs of higher justificatory complexity first. Our
measure of rationality then would be the agent’s ability to reason to beliefs
of certain justificatory complexity form a set support set. However, this
view falls to the second objection raised against Hintikka above. In typical
cases, there is not a uniform degree of justificatory complexity throughout
the beliefs at the periphery of an agent’s justification network. We have an
additional problem in the case of beliefs which may be justified is more than
one way. For example, we cannot tell if the set {φ,ψ, φ→ ψ} was obtained
by modus ponens from {φ, φ → ψ} or from {φ,ψ} by disjunction introduc-
tion and the rewrite rule for ‘→’ in terms of ‘∨’. We might know that we
need to treat our agent as believing φ,ψ and φ → ψ in order to explain its
behaviour, for example. But we could not say what degree of rationality we
were thereby attributing to the agent and so could not say just how far we
need to revise our initial assumptions of perfect rationality.
The view that we treat the agent as a perfectly rational ideal reasoner
in ascribing it beliefs goes hand in hand with the view that, in so doing,
we are classifying the agent’s belief state in terms of the possble worlds
that it considers possible. This is the view presented in Hintikka’s seminal
Knowledge and Belief [Hin62], where the guiding idea is that, in believing
something, one rules out all contrary possibilities. Since the theory of each
world is deductively closed, so is the agent’s set of beliefs. The resulting
logic is therefore at least as strong as the modal logic K, with knowledge
and belief operators distributing over ‘∧’ and ‘→’. It follows that any agent
modelled in this way is modelled as having perfect rationality: agents believe
all consequences of their beliefs, believe all tautologies, and have perfectly
consistent beliefs. This has been dubbed the problem of logical omniscience.
The problem, of course, is that real agents are not logically omniscient.
There have been numerous attempts to modify the possible worlds mod-
els to avoid logical omniscience, for example by basing the notion of a world
on relevant rather than classical logic.5 However, such attempts are badly
motivated and it can be shown that agents remain logically omniscient in
relevant (rather than classical) logic (see [Jag06b]). Another view, presented
5See, for instance, [Cre73, Lev84, Lak86, FHV90]. These accounts are reviewed in
[FHMV95]and [Whi03].
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in Belief, Awareness and Limited Reasoning [FH88] is that an agent’s be-
liefs do indeed form a perfectly rational theory, but are then filtered through
an ‘awareness’ filter. Awareness, on the other hand, is a purely syntactic
notion. It is therefore possible to alter the properties of awareness without
modifying the underlying framework of (idealised) belief. In fact, we need
not specify properties of the awareness set a priori but, “[o]nce we have
a concrete interpretation in mind, we may want to add some restrictions”
[FH88, p. 54]. However, it seems essential to the success of the awareness
model that, in general, awareness sets have no closure properties whatsoever.
As Fagin and Halpern comment,
people do not necessarily identify formulas such as ψ∧φ and φ∧
ψ. Order of presentation does seem to matter. And a computer
program that can determine whether φ ∧ ψ follows from some
initial premises in time τ might not be able to determine whether
ψ ∧ φ follows from those premises in time τ . [FH88, p. 53, their
emphasis]
Now, an agent’s belief set B may only be deductively closed to the extent
that the corresponding awareness set A is.6 If our language is L, define a
closure operator Cl of type 2L −→ 2L such that φ ∈ B implies φ ∈ Cl(B)
and Cl(Cl(B) = Cl(B). Then it is easy to show that B = Cl(B) only if
A = Cl(A) (the proof is simple, by induction on the structure any φ ∈ B
and the definition of belief in terms of awareness). I call this the awareness
closure principle. So, given a concrete formulation of awareness we may ask,
why could this notion not be used to define a notion of belief directly, using
whatever principles were used to determine the properties of the awareness
set. A potential notion of awareness given in [FH88, 54] is that the ele-
ments of A are precisely those formulae which the agent could determine in
a specified space and/or time bound. This is, roughly, the notion I will pro-
pose below, although I will make no use of the evidently spurious notion of
awareness. Rather than describing an agent as a perfectly rational reasoner
in terms of possible worlds, and then somehow using syntactic criteria to
pare down the results, I want to argue that we can use syntactic elements
to characterise an agent’s beliefs directly.
6In the modal logic, define i’s belief set B at world w as Bwi
df
= {φ | M, w  Beliφ}.
But we may ignore the agent and world parameters here, and consider the actual beliefs
of a single agent.
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4 Propositions vs sentences
Above, I briefly discussed some relations between belief and opinion, assent
or acceptance of a sentence. We might also include judgements in the latter
category which, according to Dennett [Den81, Chapter 16], Perry [Per80]
and de Sousa [dS71], are not to be treated on a par with belief. One way
to make the distinction, following Malcolm [Mal72], would be to claim that,
whilst it certainly seems appropriate to say that the chicken believes (or
thinks) that going to the farmer is a way of getting fed, it certainly hasn’t
judged or formed the opinion that this is so; nor has it assented to or ac-
cepted that statement. Forming judgements and opinions, and assenting
and accepting statements are conscious mental acts, whereas having beliefs
might be viewed as a different class of mental phenomenon altogether, op-
erating on a more fundamental, sub-personal level. This is why it makes
sense to attribute beliefs to an agent which it has not explicitly considered.
However, this does not licence the claim that, whilst judgement, opinion,
assent and acceptance is to be cased out in terms of statements—i.e. un-
ambiguous sentences—beliefs are to be ascribed in terms of non-linguistic
entities. For example, Dennett (following Stalnaker [Sta76]) claims that
“a particular belief is a function taking possible worlds into truth values”
[Den81, p. 305], thus identifying a belief with what many take to be an
intention or a meaning.7
Now of course it may be the case that the processes in an agent’s brain
which give rise to the behavioural phenomena via which we attribute beliefs
are themselves non-linguistic. However, we must remember that beliefs are
ascribed at a certain level of description of the agent so that, even if the
relevant processes subvenient to belief are intrinsically non-linguistic, we
need not conclude that our ways of ascribing belief should also be semantic,
rather than syntactic. As discussed above, there may be no interesting
question as to what beliefs really are, so such considerations should not be
allowed to persuade us of the supposed semantic or propositional nature of
belief.
The sense in which belief is a semantic, propositional phenomenon is as
follows. Suppose two agents each have a belief that they would express as
“it’s raining.” Agent a has the belief in London on Monday, b has it in New
York on Wednesday. So a believes that it is raining in London on Monday,
whereas b believes it to be raining in New York on Wednesday. They have
different beliefs, and what distinguishes them is not anything linguistic, but
7See Lewis’s [Lew75], for example).
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rather the de re fact that London isn’t New York, and Monday isn’t Wednes-
day. However, for all practical purposes—explaining and making predictions
about behaviour—the sentence “it’s raining” is perfectly adequate. Why did
the agent take an umbrella? Because it believed that it was raining.
However, the de re content of sentence which an agent would use to ex-
press her belief might not be adequate as an explanation or prediction of her
behaviour. Consider an agent perpetually annoyed by mobile phones ringing
on public transport who, upon hearing a phone continuously ring whilst on
the train to London, gets increasingly annoyed. Each time it rings, she tries
to locate the source of the annoying ring. Finally, she realises that she left
her own phone in her luggage at the end of the carriage, so comes to have a
belief that she would most naturally express as ‘it’s my phone ringing.’ This
belief explains her subsequent actions—embarrassment, motion towards her
luggage, apologies to the other passengers etc. John Perry considers a sim-
ilar example in [Per93] and concludes that no replacement of the indexical
characterisation of the agent’s belief as ‘it’s my phone ringing’ could account
for this behaviour. The (true) belief that the annoying phone belongs to the
passenger in seat 12A, for example, does not explain the behaviour unless
we also add the belief that the agent would express as ‘I am the passenger
in 12A’, itself an indexical sentence.
Following Perry, it is useful to distinguish between what the agent be-
lieves and their state of belief in so believing. As our embarrassed agent
retrieves her phone, the other passengers in the carriage may well believe
our agent to be the owner of the annoying phone, but they do not share
our agent’s feelings of embarrassment and the like. They all share the same
belief—who owns the annoying phone—but they entertain that belief in dif-
ferent ways, and so are in very different belief states. Perry’s conclusion is
that there is something essential about the way we characterise such belief
states in an agent centred way, using I, me, here, now. No substitute for
‘I’ or ‘me’ would allow us to explain the agent’s egocentric behaviour. It
is most natural, then, to classify belief states at a cognitive level, in terms
of I-thoughts; and the way we typically attribute I-thoughts is through di-
rect quotation: she believed “that’s my phone.” We classify belief states,
therefore, using sentences. The same considerations apply when classifying
desire states. If all the runners in the race want to win, for example, then
they are all in the same (local, not total) desire state. Yet there is no one
contender such that all the contenders want that person to win, so they all
have different desires.
Dennett’s worry here is that language “forces us on occasion to commit
ourselves to desires altogether more stringent in their conditions of satis-
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faction than anything we would otherwise have any reason to endeavor to
satisfy.” language is too specific for the specification of desire, for “you
often cannot say what you want without saying something more specific
than you antecedently mean.” These worries apply equally to the classifi-
cation of belief states, “where our linguistic environment is forever forcing
us to give—or concede—precise verbal expression to convictions that lack
the hard edges verbalization endows them with.” Now, we may object here
that language frequently does not look as precise as Dennett would have us
believe. Vagueness, in particular, is an intrinsic feature of natural language.
Our predicates tend not to neatly partition the domain, but instead direct
us to a sample to which the present case may be more or less similar. We
make extensive use of vague quantifiers such as for some and, even when we
use a determinate quantifier for all, the domain of quantification is nearly
always contextually specified, but need not do so in a precise way (this latter
consideration also applies to definite descriptions).
We can point to numerous examples in which an expression of desire sug-
gests satisfaction conditions broader than our antecedent desire. This does
not show that the desire does not have an intrinsic language-like component,
but only that the agent chose the wrong way of expressing her desire. More-
over, in expressing a desire linguistically, one can appeal to all the usual
pragmatic features usually associated with discourse. A desire to eat a low-
fat meal, which excludes eating dust as a satisfaction condition, is perfectly
well expressed as “I’d like something low in fat” in a restaurant setting.
Anyone thinking that serving the utterer a plate of dust would satisfy the
request is not playing within the conventions of the game. We often say
things that, taken literally, are either more general or more specific than we
literally mean, but this does not imply that meanings cannot be expressed
linguistically. It merely highlights how conventional practise allows us to
express ourselves concisely and efficiently. The same holds for desire and
belief. This is the first conclusion that I wanted to arrive at: belief (and
desire) states are to be characterised in terms of sentences.
5 The Fan of Bounded Rationality
Now I turn to what I take to be the correct way to characterise an agent’s
belief state. Dennett took the correct method to be one of first assuming the
agent to be perfectly rational and then revising downwards. I have argued
that this approach cannot be made to work. Rather, the correct method
in classifying a belief state is as follows. We first add statements which
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the agent’s actions and expressed opinions indicate it as assenting to. We
then add the mundane, everyday truths for which the agent’s experience is
adequate direct evidence. These are the truths which an agent may come to
believe in an experiential and non-inferential way. The belief that my car is
not in the parking bay falls into this category, whereas the the belief that my
car has been stolen, inferred from this belief plus my recollection of having
parked it in that very bay earlier (plus the general belief that cars tend not
to move by themselves), does not. We “attribute as beliefs all the truths
relevant to the system’s interests (or desires) that the system’s experience to
date has made available” [Den87, p. 18] with the proviso that these truths are
directly experienced and not inferred. We would also add relevant desires,
in line with the intentional method. The difference between this step and
Dennett’s suggestion is that we do not attribute any inferential ability at
all to the agent, but only the ability to gather and correctly conceptualise
the evidence of its senses. Finally, we add statements which can be seen to
be supported by sets of statements already added within the limits of the
agent’s bounded rationality. In this way, we can make sense of an agent
being rational enough, given our interpretational purposes.
By way of example, suppose the first step of our characterisation of
agent a’s belief set includes the statements that black clouds indicate that it
is likely to rain later and umbrellas prevent one from getting wet in the rain
(perhaps because the agent’s previous behaviour that the agent is of such an
opinion) and the second interpretational step adds the statement that there
are black clouds overhead and that a desires to avoid getting wet. Now, we
can explain why the agent took an umbrella with her in the morning and we
only have to ascribe a fairly limited amount of rationality to a in doing so.
We certainly would not commit ourselves to a’s believing all propositional
tautologies or having the ability to solve the Riemann hypothesis on the
basis of our explanation of why she took the umbrella.
Rationality has come into the picture in the following additive way.
Where the agent has sufficient resources available for reasoning, we assume
that it will use these resources in a more or less rational way. This is not
to say that it will be a perfectly efficient reasoner and always choose the
shortest path of reasoning to a given view. But we may assume that the
agent will reason as well as we would, were we in the agent’s situation. We
don’t have to concern ourselves with whether the agent reasons using modus
ponens, for example. In the case of artificial agents, we might have to re-
vise these assumptions, for example, if we know that the agent reasons in a
specific domain and in a specific way.
The first two stages of the method just described give us sentences which
express what we might call the agent’s minimal beliefs. These will include
sentences expressing the agent’s judgements and opinions, or the sentences
that the agent assents to, which we get from observing the agent. That all
such sentences express beliefs of the agent is echoed in Perry’s thought that
acceptance ‘is an important component of belief. It is the contribution the
subject’s mind makes to belief. One has a belief by accepting a sentence”
[Per80, p. 45]. However, following Dennett’s line on the status of beliefs, we
might want to say that an an agent believes much more than it has ever con-
sciously considered, and therefore more than it has ever accepted, assented
to or judged to be the case. This is why the second stage of the method
is necessary. Suppose we call these first two stages of belief ascription the
minimal intentional method. The exact details are not particularly impor-
tant. What is important is that, in using such a method, we are not making
grand demands of the agent’s capacity for rational deliberation.
Now, of course it may be that Dennett’s overall approach is radically
wrong (although I suspect that it could not be far form the mark). One
might hold, along with Fodor, that questions of psychological interpretation
should be settled by appeal to primitive semantic properties as would be
found, for example, in a language of thought. The problem here is that even
an inner mental language would face the problems of interpretation which
first moved Quine to write that “[t]he metaphor of a black box, so often
useful, can be misleading here. The problem is not one of hidden facts,
such as might be uncovered by learning more about the brain physiology of
thought processes” [Qui70, p. 180]. Putnam is in agreement, for ““[m]ental
representations” require interpretation just as much as any other signs do”
[Put83, p. 154]. Although I believe this to show that an account along the
lines of Putnam’s (with the modifications suggested above) must be the right
one, what I have to say below should be perfectly compatible with Fodor’s
general picture, or any account which provides a set of sentences which are
taken to be the agent’s minimal beliefs.
Above, I argued that candidate formal models of downwards revision
could not be made to work. So as not to shirk my responsibilities, some
formal account of the additive rationality ascription is now required. I will
give only a brief and fairly non-technical outline here. A model M is a
relational structure which may be described by a modal logic containing the
‘♦’ operator. The domain of M is simply a set of points S (which, following
standard practise will be called states), some of which will be related by a
serial relation T , called the transition relation, which forms a tree on these
13
points.8 Each point is labelled by a number of non-modal sentences of our
language.
So much is standard fare for modal logics, give or take some terminology.
The particularity of the models we are interested in comes in the states which
may be related by T . Whenever Tsu holds, u must be labelled just like s
except that, in addition, u is labelled by some additional formula. So, for
some formula φ, we have V (u) = V (s)∪{φ} whenever Tsu. Here, I say that
u extends s by φ. Moreover, T is in a sense greedy, in that whenever a state
can be extended by a formula φ, there is always a state u extending s by φ
such that Tsu.
Just what does it mean to say that a state can be extended by a
formula?—or, rather, when could a state not be so extended? Here we come
to the principle idea: transitions between states model the agent’s atomic
inferences—the act of inferring just one new formula from those it already
believes. In principle, these inferences could be of any type—deductive, in-
ductive and abductive. We might characterise all such types of reasoning as
rule-based reasoning (this is what gives it its normative flavour), and purely
deductive rules as those which always give rise to monotonic reasoning (rea-
soning in which derived conclusions never need to be withdrawn without
also withdrawing their premises). A state s may be extended by a formula
φ when φ is the conclusion of a rule of inference whose premises match the
formulas which label s. Or rather, since such rules tend to be meta-rules
containing sentence-variables, we should talk about φ being the conclusion
under some substitution instance of a rule whose premises, under that same
substitution, are all labels of s. In a model M , whenever a state s may
be so extended, there is a state u suitably extending s such that Tsu. We
don’t have to represent these reasoning rules explicitly in the model; they
are captured by regularities in the way T relates similar states to similar
states.
So much for the details of our models. What use are they? We apply
them as follows. First, we run what I have called the minimal intentional
method and arrive at a set of sentences, all of which express beliefs of the
agent (it is likely, of course, to have many more beliefs than this). Call this
set B0. We label the root of our model M with all and only the elements
of B0. Now we have to fix what rules our agent reasons with—which will
automatically fix T (we may assume we have an infinite supply of states and
that V labels states randomly, so that we have all possible states available—
8The restriction to models in tree form is inessential, as it is a theorem of normal modal
logics that every model is bisimilar to a tree model. See, for example, [BdRV02].
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note that we make no assumption that each V (s) be classically consistent
or deductively closed). Just which rules we select will depend on our setting
and our purpose. If we are to model an AI system, for example, it makes
sense to select the rules of inference that the system actually uses.9 In the
cases of human belief, we assume that the agent reasons using whatever rules
we expect or are typical of human reasoning—including inductive reasoning
and inference to best explanation.10 Once we have fixed a set of rules, our
model itself is fixed.
Let us look at the model we have built. In models that include certain
deductive rules—natural deduction-style introduction rules, say—there will
be no finite bound on the length of branches through the model. In the
purely deductive case, the least transfinite fixpoint of each branch gives us
the deductive closure of the sentences which label the root of the model—
i.e. the set of minimal beliefs B0. Such points are the closest states to the
root lying on a branch but not reachable from the root in a finite number
of transitions. They represent the commitments that any agent would enter
into on believing the sentences that label the root of the model to be true.
Section 2 concluded that an agent’s beliefs lie in between its minimal beliefs
and its commitments. In terms of our model, the beliefs we should ascribe
to the agent must lie somewhere between its root and its leaves. Just how
far from the root they lie is a matter of deciding the degree of rationality
we want to treat the agent as having (note that this is a decision required
by any account based around the intentional method).
Suppose we find in our model a particular set of sentences which, treated
as beliefs and together with the desires we ascribe, explain what we want
to explain, e.g. the agent’s behaviour. We look for the smallest such set
of sentences, and find the state closest to the root of M which is labelled
by all of these sentences. Call this state s; it has a certain depth δ in the
model (not to be confused with quantifier depth), equal to the number of
transitions required to reach s from the root. We are in effect saying that, in
order to make sense of the agent’s behaviour for our purposes, we only need
to consider the agent rational enough to reason to depth δ in the model. The
9Many systems in AI are explicitly programmed in a rule-based fashion. Rule-based
programming allows for a great degree of abstraction in specifying behaviour and conse-
quently several rule-based agent architectures have been developed, e.g. SOAR [LANR87]
and Sim-Agent [SL99]. Rule-based programming extensions are also increasingly be-
ing offered as add-ons to existing, lower-level, agent toolkits, e.g., JADE [BPR01] and
FIPA-OS [PBH00].
10In the formal model described in [Jag06b], I only consider deductive rules; formulating
formal rules for abductive reasoning is no small task!
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sentences that we should say the agents believes, then, are those sentences
labelling any state of depth δ. In the pure deductive case, the labels of states
at any depth subsume those of less depth, but this will not be the case in
general in a non-deductive setting. By picking only those labels at depth
δ, we ignore both those sentences that the agent would not be sufficiently
rational to assent to (these are the labels on states of greater depth than s)
and those sentences that the agent could assent to, but then later realise to
be mistaken and withdraw its assent from (the labels on states of depth less
than s). In terms of our modal language, in which ‘♦φ’ holds at a state u
iff there is a transition to a state v at which φ holds, we say that our agent
believes that φ iff ♦δφ (that is, φ proceeded by δ ‘♦’s) is satisfied at the root
of the model. In fact, we can generalise this definition to any state in our
model, since every state is the root of the tree formed by its descendants.
We may use a modal language Lδ parameterised by δ containing a sentential
operator ‘Bel’ such that Belφ
df
= ♦δφ.
If the entire tree represents the reasoning possibilities of an ideal agent,
with one possible line of reasoning per branch, we have limited our attri-
bution of rationality by chopping off each of the branches at depth δ. We
might imagine a wedge-shaped fan, whose are of length δ, held over the tree
so that its sides run parallel to the outermost branches of the tree. The area
within the fan represents belief states which the agent could reason itself
into from the set of minimal beliefs we attribute it. The states we find along
the bottom edge of the fan are thus the most advanced belief states which
this agent could reach, given its bounded rationality. We thus say it believes
whatever labels we find at states along the bottom edge of the fan.
As with other modal epistemic logics, it is easy to extend the account to
incorporate multiple agents. Suppose we want model agents a1, . . . , an. Let
∆ = δ1 · · · δn be a sequence of length n, where each δi≤n is the measure of
rationality we want to assign to agent i. Models contain a family V1, . . . , Vn
of labelling functions, one for each agent. The language L∆ is parameterised
by ∆ and contains belief operators Bel1, . . . ,Beln and a family of additional
operators B1, . . .Bn such that Biφ holds at a state s iff φ ∈ Vi(s). Then we
define Beliφ
df
= ♦δiBiφ.
As it stands, this account is subject to the same criticism levelled against
attempts to downwardly revise assumptions of perfect rationality in section 3
above, namely that an agent is assumed to be rational to degree δ across the
board. But agents typically direct their rational enquiry in one direction or
another. An agent who has followed through the consequences of her beliefs
about quantum physics, for example, is not guaranteed to have been just as
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rational in her beliefs about ethics, or what constitutes sensible footwear.
However, the account presented here is unlike those criticised above in
that this problem can be overcome by restricting our selection of states at
depth δ and less to those which can reached from the root with no irrelevant
inferences. Suppose the sequence of states s0s1s2 occurs on a branch b and
that s1 extends s0 by the sentence “I should avoid wearing heels on icy days”,
and that s2 extends s1 by “murder is wrong”. Under most classifications,
the topic has shifted quite dramatically from one inference to the next. If
we want to explain why the agent first put on her high heels but then after
checking the weather decided on a pair of flats, we can ignore branches such
as b which model off-topic or irrelevant inferences.
Concretely, we might place all sentences in the language in an abstract
relevance network, such that the longer the shortest distance between any
two sentences, the less relevant they are to one another (the relevance re-
lation is reflexive, such that every sentence is as of the highest degree of
relevance to itself). Then, we decide just how relevant we want our agent to
be—say to degree r. We then return to our original chosen state s, whose
labels allow us to explain the agent’s behaviour, and look up all sentences φ
of distance no more that r in the relevance network from one of the labels
of s. A branch is then excluded from our considerations iff a state on the
branch of depth no greater than δ extends a previous state by a sentence
not selected from the relevance network.
It should be pointed out that, in practise, our choice of a degree of
rationality δ may not be a perfectly precise matter. Suppose we follow the
method I have suggested and attribute belief in φ and φ → ψ to agent a.
Must we also say that the agent believes ψ? It seems odd that the agent
would not have this belief and yet we may have picked the least deep state in
the tree at which φ and φ→ ψ both appear, in which case our method need
not say that the agent believes ψ. With a choice of δ+1, on the other hand,
we would say that a does believe that ψ. This sounds somewhat unintuitive,
but this is only to be expected in an account in which agent’s beliefs are not
deductively closed.
The problem arises when we try to classify belief states in terms of strict,
numerical identity, i.e. when we say that a belief state including φ→ ψ and
φ must also include ψ, because the latter belief state is identical to the
former. This is really just a way of saying that the identity conditions on
belief states includes the deductive closure condition. As I argued above,
this just is not the case. Rather, we should say that the two belief states
are sufficiently similar, in fact so similar that we feel it odd to say that
an agent believing φ → ψ and φ would not also believe that ψ. One-
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step inference always produced similar belief sets but chains of inference
may not. The case is somewhat similar to Sorites-style problems involving
vague predicates. Given a sequence of colour patches from dark red to
light orange, we would find it rather artificial to impose a sharp boundary
between the red and the orange samples, yet of course the endpoints are
clearly different colours. If we follow Dennett in that belief “can be discerned
only from the point of view of one who adopts a certain predictive strategy”
[Den87, p. 15], then a particular predictive strategy may well impose a
sharpened boundary, based around whatever reason we are predicting the
agent’s behaviour. Thus, “agent a believes that φ and φ→ ψ, but not ψ” is
by no means contradictory. Rather, the account I have presented here, on
which this ascription is satisfiable, highlights how our practises in ascribing
belief fits in with our ascription of predicates such as “is bald” and “is red”
in general.
The kind of model developed here is versatile. In [Jag06a], I show dis-
cuss the advantages of using such models to capture epistemic possibility.
In these terms, an account of dynamic information can be developed which
avoids the traditional problem of considering agents to be ideally rational
reasoners with unbounded resources. In [Jag06b], on the other hand, I de-
velop a temporal account of the explicit beliefs (what Dennett would term
opinions) of AI agents, allowing one to build a model of an agent and check
whether, for example, the agent could come to believe some sentence φ
within a fixed time bound. As well as being versatile, the models developed
here have many interesting logical properties, as discussed in [Jag06b]. For
example, when modelling an agent with a fixed program (set of inference
rules), the satisfaction relation ‘’ is decidable. Such properties make these
models easy to work with. This adds support to my claim that the assump-
tion of perfect rationality in modelling psychological notions is unnecessary,
both conceptually and practically. I have presented a genuine account of
belief states according to which agents are not modelled as perfectly ratio-
nal reasoners. When combined with the logical results given in [Jag06b], we
see that the formal models of this account are just as useful to logicians in
modelling agents but, in the case of resource bounded agents, produce far
more accurate results.
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